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 1 Introduction
In recent years there has been a considerable debate on the advantages and
disadvantages of moving towards a full mark-to-market accounting system for
ﬁnancial institutions such as banks and insurance companies. This debate
has been triggered by the move of the International Accounting Standards
Board (IASB) and the US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to
make changes in this direction as part of an attempt to globalize accounting
standards (Hansen 2004). There are two sides to the controversy in the de-
bate. Proponents of mark-to-market accounting argue that this accounting
method reﬂects the true (and relevant) value of the balance sheets of ﬁnancial
institutions. This in turn should allow investors and policy makers to better
assess their risk proﬁle and undertake more timely market discipline and cor-
rective actions. In contrast, opponents claim that mark-to-market accounting
leads to excessive and artiﬁcial volatility. As a consequence, the value of the
balance sheets of ﬁnancial institutions would be driven by short-term ﬂuctu-
ations of the market that do not reﬂect the value of the fundamentals and
the value at maturity of assets and liabilities.
In this paper we argue that adopting a mark-to-market system to value
the assets of ﬁnancial institutions may not be beneﬁcial when ﬁnancial mar-
kets are illiquid. In times of ﬁnancial crisis the interaction of institutions
and markets can lead to situations where prices in illiquid markets do not
reﬂect future payoﬀs but rather reﬂect the amount of cash available to buy-
ers in the market. The level of liquidity in such markets is endogenously
determined and there is liquidity pricing. When historic cost accounting is
in use, this problem does not compromise the solvency of banks as it does not
aﬀect the accounting value of their assets. In contrast, when mark-to-market
accounting is used, the volatility of asset prices directly aﬀects the value of
banks’ assets. This can lead to contagion and force banks into insolvency
even though they would be fully able to cover their commitments if they
were allowed to continue until the assets mature.
The potential problems that might have arisen had Long Term Capital
Management (LTCM) been allowed to go bankrupt illustrate the issue. The
Federal Reserve Bank of New York justiﬁed its action of facilitating a private
sector bailout of LTCM by arguing that if the fund had been liquidated
many prices in illiquid markets would have fallen and this would have caused
further liquidations and so on in a downward spiral. The point of our paper is
to argue that using mark-to-market accounting signiﬁcantly exacerbates the
2problem of contagion in such circumstances compared to the use of historic
cost accounting. The notion that market prices cannot be trusted to value
assets in times of crisis has a long history. In his inﬂuential book, Lombard
Street, on how central banks should respond to crises, Bagehot (1873) argued
that collateral should be valued weighting panic and pre-panic prices. Our
conclusion is similar in that in times of crisis market prices are not accurate
measures of value.
To better understand the role of diﬀerent accounting methods during
crises, we present a model with a banking sector and an insurance sector
based on Allen and Gale (2005a) and Allen and Carletti (2006). Banks
obtain funds from depositors who can be early or late consumers in the
usual way. The distinguishing feature of banks is that they have expertise
in making risky loans to ﬁrms. They can invest in long and short term
ﬁnancial assets as well. They use the returns of the short asset to satisfy the
claims of depositors withdrawing early and the returns from the loans and
long asset to pay the late consumers. We focus on the case where the banks
are always solvent despite the risk of their loans. The insurance companies
insure a second group of ﬁrms against the possibility of their machines being
damaged the following period. They collect premiums and invest them in
the short asset to fund the costs of repairing the ﬁrms’ machines.
In this framework there are three main elements that are necessary for
contagion to occur.
• T h e r em u s tb eas o u r c eo fsystemic risk. We show how such risk can
arise optimally in the insurance sector.
• The banking and insurance sectors must both hold a long asset that
can be liquidated in the market so there is the possibility of contagion.
In our model credit risk transfer can induce the insurance companies
to hold the long asset as well as the banks.
• Liquidity pricing of the long asset can interact with mark-to-market
a c c o u n t i n gr u l e st op r o d u c ec o n t a g i o ne v e nt h o u g hw i t hh i s t o r i cc o s t
accounting there would be none.
We start by considering the operation of the banking and insurance in-
dustries separately. Conditions are identiﬁed where it is optimal for the
insurance companies to insure ﬁrms when only a limited number of machines
3are damaged, and go bankrupt when a large number of machines are dam-
aged. This partial insurance is optimal if the probability of a large amount
of damage is small and the return on the long asset is high so the opportu-
nity cost of investing in the short asset is also high. The failure of insurance
companies does not involve deadweight costs and does not spill over to the
banking sector because the two sectors have only the short asset in common.
The insurance sector though is a potential source of systemic risk in the
economy.
In order for there to be contagion to the banking sector, it is necessary
that both sectors hold the long asset. The insurance sector only needs to
hold the short asset to pool the risk for the ﬁrms whose machines may be
damaged. However, if credit risk transfer is introduced to allow the bank-
ing and insurance sectors to diversify risk, insurance companies may ﬁnd it
optimal to hold the long asset. This provides the potential for contagion of
systemic risk from the insurance sector to the banking sector.
When insurance companies hold the long asset they must liquidate it when
they go bankrupt. The market they sell the asset on will involve liquidity
pricing. In order to induce some market participants to hold liquidity to
purchase assets, there must be states in which asset prices are “low” so the
participants can make a proﬁt and cover the opportunity cost of holding
the short asset in the other states. The low prices are determined by the
endogenous amount of liquidity in the market rather than the future earning
power of the asset. If historic cost accounting is in use so assets are valued
at their historic cost, the low liquidation prices do not lead to contagion.
Banks are not aﬀected by the low prices. They remain solvent and can
continue operating until their assets mature. In this case the credit risk
transfer improves welfare. The insurance companies hold the more proﬁtable
long asset and there is no unnecessary and costly contagion when they go
bankrupt.
In contrast, when mark-to-market accounting is in use so assets are priced
according to market values, low prices can cause a problem of contagion from
the insurance sector to the banking sector. Even if banks would be solvent
if they were allowed to continue, the current market value of their assets is
lower than the value of their liabilities. Banks are then declared insolvent
and forced to sell their long term assets. This worsens the illiquidity problem
in the market and reduces prices even further. The overall eﬀect of this
contagion is to lower welfare compared to what would happen with historic
cost accounting.
4This result has important implications for the debate on the optimal
accounting system. In particular, it stresses the potential problems arising
from the use of mark-to-market for securities traded in markets with scarce
liquidity. In this sense, the accounting-induced contagion that we describe
could emerge in the context of many ﬁnancial institutions and markets and
our results should be interpreted as one example of the phenomenon.
Our paper is related to a number of others. Plantin, Sapra, and Shin
(2004) show that, while a historic cost regime can lead to some ineﬃciencies,
mark-to-market pricing can lead to increased price volatility and suboptimal
real decisions due to feedback eﬀects. Their analysis suggests the problems
with mark-to-market accounting are particularly severe when claims are long-
lived, illiquid, and senior. The assets of banks and insurance companies are
particularly characterized by these traits. This provides an explanation of
why banks and insurance companies have been so vocal against the move to
mark-to-market accounting. In the current paper an additional reason for
banks and insurance companies to be disturbed by mark-to-market account-
ing is provided. Mark-to-market accounting can induce contagion where
historic cost accounting would not.
Other papers analyze the implications of mark-to-market accounting from
a variety of perspectives. O’Hara (1993) focuses on the eﬀects of market value
accounting on loan maturity, and ﬁnds that this accounting system increases
the interest rates for long-maturity loans, thus inducing a shift to shorter-
term loans. In turn this reduces the liquidity creation function of banks and
exposes borrowers to “excessive” liquidation. In a similar vein, Burkhardt
and Strausz (2006) suggest that market value accounting reduces asymmetric
information, thus increasing liquidity and intensifying risk-shifting problems.
Finally, Freixas and Tsomocos (2004) show that market value accounting
worsens the role of banks as institutions smoothing intertemporal shocks.
Diﬀerently, our paper focuses on liquidity pricing to show how market value
accounting can lead to contagion and so may not be desirable.
Allen and Carletti (2006) analyze how ﬁnancial innovation can create
contagion across sectors and lower welfare relative to the autarky solution.
However, while Allen and Carletti (2006) focus on the structure of liquidity
shocks hitting the banking sector as the main mechanism generating conta-
g i o n ,w ef o c u sh e r eo nt h ei m p a c to fd i ﬀerent accounting methods and show
that mark-to-market accounting can lead to contagion in situations where
h i s t o r i cc o s ta c c o u n t i n gd o e sn o t .
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops a model
5with a banking and an insurance sector. Section 3 considers the autarkic
equilibrium where the sectors operate in isolation. Conditions are identiﬁed
for systemic risk to arise in the insurance sector. Section 4 analyzes the
functioning of credit risk transfer and the circumstances in which it can
induce insurance companies to hold the long asset. Section 5 considers the
interaction of liquidity pricing and accounting rules. In particular, it is shown
that mark-to-market accounting can result in contagion even though with
historic cost accounting there would be none. An example is presented in
Section 6 to show that all the conditions derived in the previous sections can
be simultaneously satisﬁed. Finally, Section 7 contains concluding remarks.
2T h e m o d e l
The model is based on the analyses of crises and systemic risk in Allen and
Gale (1998, 2000, 2004a-b, 2005b) and Gale (2003, 2004), and particularly in
Allen and Gale (2005a) and Allen and Carletti (2006). A standard model of
intermediation is extended by adding an insurance sector. The two sectors
face risks that are not perfectly correlated so there is scope for diversiﬁcation.
There are three dates t =0 ,1,2 and a single, all-purpose good that can be
used for consumption or investment at each date. The banking and insurance
sectors consist of a large number of competitive institutions and their lines of
business do not overlap. This is a necessary assumption, since the combina-
tion of intermediation and insurance activities in a single ﬁnancial institution
would eliminate the need for markets and the feasibility of mark-to-market
accounting.
There are two securities, one short and one long. The short security is
represented by a storage technology: one unit at date t produces one unit at
date t+1. The long security is a simple constant-returns-to-scale investment
t e c h n o l o g yt h a tt a k e st w op e r i o d st om a t u r e :o n eu n i ti n v e s t e di nt h el o n g
security at date 0 produces R>1 units of the good at date 2.W ec a nt h i n k
of these securities as being bonds or any other investment that is common to
both banks and insurance companies. Initially we assume there is no market
for liquidating the long asset at date 1.
In addition to these securities, banks and insurance companies have dis-
tinct direct investment opportunities and diﬀerent liabilities. Banks can make
loans to ﬁrms. Each ﬁr mb o r r o w so n eu n i ta td a t e0 and invests in a risky
venture that produces B units of the good at date 2 with probability β and
60 with probability 1 − β. There is assumed to be a limited number of such
ﬁrms with total demand for loans equal to z, so that they take all the surplus
and give banks a repayment b (≤ B), as we describe more fully below. We
assume throughout that there is no market for liquidating loans at date 1.
B a n k sr a i s ef u n d sf r o md e p o s i t o r s ,w h oh a v ea ne n d o w m e n to fo n eu n i t
of the good at date 0 and none at dates 1 and 2. Depositors are uncer-
tain about their preferences: with probability λ they are early consumers,
w h oo n l yv a l u et h eg o o da td a t e1, and with probability 1 − λ they are late
consumers, who only value the good at date 2. Uncertainty about time pref-
erences generates a preference for liquidity and a role for the intermediary as
a provider of liquidity insurance. The utility of consumption is represented by
a utility function U(c) with the usual properties. We normalize the number
of depositors to one. Since banks compete to raise deposits, they choose the
contracts they oﬀer to maximize depositors’ expected utility. If they failed
to do so, another bank could step in and oﬀer a better contract to attract
away all their customers.
Insurance companies sell insurance to a large number of ﬁrms, whose
measure is also normalized to one. Each ﬁrm has an endowment of one unit
at date 0 and owns a machine that produces A units of the good at date
2. With probability α state H is realized and a proportion αH of machines
suﬀers some damage at date 1. Unless repaired at a cost of η<A ,t h e y
become worthless and produce nothing at date 2. With probability 1−α state
L is realized and a proportion αL of machines suﬀer some damage and need to
be repaired. Thus, there is aggregate risk in the insurance sector in that the
fraction of machines damaged at date 1 is stochastic. Firms cannot borrow
against the future income of the machines because they have no collateral and
the income cannot be pledged. Instead they can buy insurance against the
probability of incurring the damage at date 1 in exchange for a premium φ
at date 0. The insurance companies collect the premiums and invest them at
date 0 in order to pay the ﬁrms at date 1. The owners of the ﬁrms consume at
date 2 and have a utility function V (C) with the usual properties. Similarly
to the banks, the insurance companies operate in competitive markets and
thus maximize the expected utility of the owners of the ﬁrms. If they did not
do this, another insurance company would enter and attract away all their
customers.
Finally, we introduce a class of risk neutral investors who potentially
provide capital to the banking and insurance sectors. Investors have a large
( u n b o u n d e d )a m o u n to ft h eg o o dW0 a se n d o w m e n ta td a t e0 and nothing at
7dates 1 and 2. They provide capital to the intermediary through the contract
e =( e0,e 1,e 2),w h e r ee0 ≥ 0 denotes an investor’s supply of capital at date
t =0 , and et ≥ 0 denotes consumption at dates t =1 ,2. Although investors
a r er i s kn e u t r a l ,w ea s s u m et h a tt h e i rc o n s u m p t i o nm u s tb en o n - n e g a t i v e
at each date. Otherwise, they could absorb all risk and provide unlimited
liquidity. The investors’ utility function is then deﬁned as
u(e0,e 1,e 2)=ρW0 − ρe0 + e1 + e2,
where the constant ρ is the investors’ opportunity cost of funds. This can
represent their time preference or their alternative investment opportunities
that are not available to the other agents in the model. We assume ρ>
R so that it is not worthwhile for investors to just invest in securities at
date 0. This has two important implications. First, since investors have
a large endowment at date 0 and the capital market is competitive, there
will be an excess supply of capital and they will just earn their opportunity
cost. Second, the fact that investors have no endowment (and non-negative
consumption) at dates 1 and 2 implies that their capital must be converted
into assets in order to provide risk sharing at dates 1 and 2.
All uncertainty is resolved at the beginning of date 1. Banks discover
whether loans will pay oﬀ o rn o ta td a t e2. Depositors learn whether they
are early or late consumers. Insurance companies learn which ﬁrms have
damaged assets.
3 The autarkic equilibrium
The purpose of this section is to illustrate how the sectors work in isolation.
We use this as a benchmark for considering the interaction between liquidity
pricing and accounting methods. The ﬁrst case considered is when the bank-
ing sector and the insurance sector are autarkic and operate separately. It
is initially assumed that there are no markets so that the long asset and the
loans cannot be liquidated for a positive amount at date 1. Hence if a bank
or insurance company goes bankrupt at date 1, the proceeds from the long
asset and the loans are 0.
83.1 The banking sector
Since all banks are ex ante identical and compete to attract deposits, they
maximize the expected utility of depositors. At date 0 banks have 1 unit of
deposits and choose the amount of capital e0 to raise from investors. Then
they decide how to split the 1+e0 between x units of the short asset, y
units of the long asset and z of loans. Also, banks choose how much to
compensate investors for their capital. Since investors are indiﬀerent between
consumption at date 1 and date 2, it is optimal to set e1 =0 , invest any
capital e0 that is contributed in the long asset or loans, which have higher
returns than the short asset, and make a payout e2 to investors when loans
are successful. Given this, banks’ solve the following problem:
Max EU = λU(c1)+( 1− λ)[βU(c2H)+( 1− β)U(c2L)] (1)
subject to
c1 =
x
λ
, (2)
c2H =
yR+ zb− e2
1 − λ
, (3)
c2L =
yR
1 − λ
,( 4 )
x + y + z =1+e0, (5)
e0ρ = βe2, (6)
c1 ≤ c2L. (7)
The banks’ maximization problem can be explained as follows. Each bank
has 1 unit of depositors with λ of them becoming early consumers and 1−λ
late consumers. The ﬁrst term in the objective function represents the utility
U (c1) of the λ early consumers. The bank uses the entire proceeds of the
short term asset to provide each of them with a level of consumption c1 as in
(2). The second term represents the 1 − λ depositors who become late con-
sumers. With probability β loans pay oﬀ B, banks receive the repayment b
and have to pay e2 to investors so that each late consumer receives consump-
tion c2H as in (3). With probability 1 − β the loans pay oﬀ 0. The bank has
only the return from the long asset and each late consumer gets c2L as in (4).
T h ec o n s t r a i n t( 5 )i st h eb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n ta td a t e0, while the constraint
(6) is investors’ participation constraint. Investors must receive an expected
9payoﬀ which makes them break even. As already mentioned, it is optimal to
give them a repayment only when loans pay B and banks obtain b (which oc-
curs with probability β) so that depositors have their lowest marginal utility
of consumption. The inequality (7) is the incentive compatibility constraint.
Since depositor type is unobservable there will be a run on the bank with all
depositors withdrawing at date 1 if it is not satisﬁed.
Substituting the constraints (2)-(6) into the objective function (1), and
noting that y =1+e0−x−z from (5), we can reduce the number of decision
variables to x,z and e0. The amount of funds z banks invest in loans results
from the equilibrium in the loan market. Given that there is a limited number
of ﬁrms who want loans relative to banks, the ﬁrms obtain the surplus. This
means that loans are priced so that banks are indiﬀerent between providing
loans and not providing them. Since bank capital is the marginal source of
ﬁnance, the amount paid on loans in equilibrium just covers the marginal
cost of equity capital and is then equal to b = ρ/β < B. At this price, banks
satisfy ﬁrms’ total demand for loans so that z = z.
The banks’ problem then reduces to choosing x and e0 to solve the fol-
lowing problem:
Max EU = λU(
x
λ
)+( 1− λ)[βU(
(1 + e0 − x − z)R +( z − e0)(ρ/β)
(1 − λ)
)
+(1 − β)U(
(1 + e0 − x − z)R
(1 − λ)
)]
subject to (7).
The solution depends on whether the constraint (7) binds or not. If it
does not bind (that is, if c1 ≤ c2L), then the ﬁrst order conditions are
∂EU
∂x
= U
0
(c1L) − R[βU
0
(c2H)+( 1− β)U
0
(c2L)] = 0,
∂EU
∂e0
= β(R − ρ/β)U
0
(c2H)+( 1− β)RU
0
(c2L)=0 , (8)
where c1, c2H and c2L are as in (2), (3) and (4), respectively.
If (7) does bind, then the bank invests an amount x = λyR/(1 − λ) in
the short asset such that c1 = c2L, while as before it chooses the amount e0
of capital that satisﬁes (8).
One important issue concerns the role that capital is playing in the bank-
ing sector. Since the suppliers of capital are risk neutral they provide risk
10smoothing to the depositors in the bank. The assets their capital provides
pay oﬀ when the loans do not and they only receive a payment when the
loans pay oﬀ. The reason that the providers of capital do not bear all the
risk is that capital is costly. In other words their opportunity cost of capital
is higher than the return on the long asset. If it was the same, there would
be full risk sharing and depositors would consume the same amount in every
state.
3.2 The insurance sector
We consider the insurance sector in isolation next. As already explained,
insurance companies oﬀer insurance to ﬁrms against the possibility that their
machines are damaged at date 1 and need to be repaired at a cost η. Similarly
to the banking industry, the insurance sector is competitive. Companies
maximize the expected utility of the owners of the ﬁrms they insure and do
not earn any proﬁts. The insurance contract can consist of partial or full
insurance. In the case of partial insurance, companies insure ﬁrms in state
H and go bankrupt in state L. In the case of full insurance, ﬁrms are insured
in both states and insurance companies never fail. Which contract is optimal
depends on the opportunity cost of providing full insurance relative to the
cost incurred in the case of bankruptcy. When the ﬁrst dominates, providing
partial insurance is optimal and the insurance sector is subject to systemic
risk.
We start with the case of partial insurance. Companies charge a premium
φp at date 0 and invest it in the short asset to have liquidity to satisfy
the claims αHη at date 1. Given the insurance sector is competitive, the
companies maximize the expected utility of the owners of the ﬁrms they
insure and set the premium φp = αHη. Thus, ﬁrms’ owners have an expected
utility given by
EVp = αV (C2H)+( 1− α)V (C2L)
where
C2H = A +( 1− φp)R, (9)
C2L = φp +( 1− φp)R. (10)
Firms pay φp and, since there is no market for liquidating the long asset
at date 1 and their owners consume only at date 2,t h e yﬁnd it optimal to
invest the remaining 1 − φp directly in the long asset and obtain the return
11(1 − φp)R in both states. Then in state H (which occurs with probability
α) all damaged assets are repaired and the owners of the ﬁrms can consume
the additional return A.I ns t a t eL the insurance companies cannot satisfy
all claims αLη and go bankrupt. Their assets are distributed equally among
the claimants so that each ﬁrm receives φp.
One way to avoid bankruptcy in state L is for the insurance companies
to provide full insurance and repair the damaged assets in both states H and
L. To do this, the insurance companies charge a premium φf = αLη ≤ 1 at
date 0 and invest it in the short asset. Firms’ expected utility now equals
EVf = αV (C2H)+( 1− α)V (C2L)
where
C2H = A +( 1− φf)R +( φf − αHη), (11)
C2L = A +( 1− φf)R. (12)
Diﬀerently from before, ﬁrms’ owners can consume the return A from the
assets at date 2 in both states and the return R from investing their remain-
ing (1−φf) funds in the long asset. In state H the insurance companies use
αHη to meet their claims and, given they operate in a competitive industry,
distribute the remaining φf − αHη funds to the ﬁrms. In state L they re-
ceive claims αLη and use all their funds to satisfy them so that nothing is
distributed to the ﬁrms.
The optimal insurance scheme maximizes the expected utility of the ﬁrms’
owners. Thus, partial insurance is optimal if EVp ≥ EVf,w h i c hc a nb e
expressed as
αV (A +( 1− αHη)R)+( 1− α)V (αHη +( 1− αHη)R) (13)
≥ αV (A +( 1− αHη)R − (αL − αH)η(R − 1)) +
(1 − α)V (αHη +( 1− αHη)R + A − αHη − (αL − αH)ηR).
Despite avoiding bankruptcy, full insurance may not be optimal. Insuring
ﬁr m si nb o t hs t a t e sr e q u i r e st h ei n s u r a n c ec o m p a n i e st oc h a r g eah i g h e r
premium (φf >φ p). Thus providing full insurance implies a cost in terms of
foregone return on the more proﬁtable long asset held by the ﬁrms. When
this cost is too high, providing full insurance is not optimal. With these
considerations in mind, it is straightforward to see that the inequality (13)
is more likely to be satisﬁed
12• the higher is the probability α of the good state H,
• the smaller is the return of the asset A,
• the larger is the return of the long asset R,a n d
• the larger is the diﬀerence in the proportion of damaged assets αH−αL.
As a ﬁnal remark note that there is no role for capital in the insurance
sector so that E0 =0 . The reason is that capital providers charge a premium
to cover their opportunity cost ρ. Insurance companies should invest the
capital provided by investors in the short asset since it is not optimal to
hold any of the long asset. There are already potentially enough funds from
customers to hold more of the short asset but it is not worth it. If there is a
premium to be paid for the capital it is even less worth it. Capital will not
be used in the insurance industry unless companies are regulated to do so.
In what follows we assume that partial insurance is optimal so that (13) is
satisﬁed and also that the expected utility from partial insurance is greater
than self-insurance and other partial strategies. This assumption ensures
t h a tt h e r ei ss y s t e m i cr i s ki nt h ei n s u r a n c es e c t o r .
4 The functioning of credit risk transfer
In the previous sections we have considered how the banking and insurance
sectors operate in isolation. We have shown that the insurance sector is
subject to systemic risk when partial insurance is optimal and the insurance
companies go bankrupt in state L. Importantly, since the insurance compa-
nies only invest in the short asset, their failure does not aﬀect the banking
sector and banks remain solvent in all states. This may not be the case,
however, if there are connections between the two sectors. For example, if
banks and insurance companies hold some common assets and these assets
c a nb el i q u i d a t e da td a t e1, then the failure of the insurance companies could
potentially propagate to the banking sector. To see when this can happen,
we modify our framework in two directions. First, we consider credit risk
transfer as an example of what can induce the insurance companies to in-
vest (at least partly) in the long asset. Second, we introduce a market for
liquidating the long asset at date 1. For the moment, we just assume that
the long asset can be sold at a price P ≤ 1, which depends on the state of
13the world. In the next section we focus on the determination of the market
price and study the interrelation between asset prices, accounting systems
and contagion.
Given that the shocks aﬀecting the two sectors are independent, we have
four states of the world depending on the realizations of the variables β and
α, which we can express as HH,HL,LH, and LL. T h e( p e r - c a p i t a )p a y o ﬀs
in each state are as follows.
Table 1
State Probability Bank Insurance Late Firms’
loans claims depositors owners
HH β × αB α Hηc 2H C2H
HL β× (1 − α) Bα Lηc 2H C2L
LH (1 − β) × α 0 αHηc 2L C2H
LL (1 − β) × (1 − α)0 αLηc 2L C2L
Credit risk transfer can be seen as a way to provide risk sharing between
the two sectors. As Table 1 shows, late depositors have diﬀerent payoﬀsi n
states HH and HL compared to states LH, and LL, and the owners of the
ﬁr m sa l s oh a v ed i ﬀerent payoﬀsi ns t a t e sHH and LH as compared to HL
and LL. This introduces the potential for risk sharing as a way to increase
welfare. We consider a particularly simple form of risk transfer: the banks
make a payment ZHL to the insurance companies in state HL when bank
loans pay oﬀ but insurance claims are high, while the insurance companies
make a payment ZLH to the banks in state LH when bank loans do not pay
oﬀ and insurance claims are low. For simplicity, we assume that the banks’
depositors obtain the surplus from the credit risk transfer. The insurance
companies will compete to provide the credit risk transfer that maximizes
the utility of the banks’ depositors at the lowest cost to themselves. In
equilibrium they will obtain their reservation utility, which is what they
would receive in autarky. This credit risk transfer improves diversiﬁcation,
but notice that markets are still not complete.
The question is how such transfers can be implemented and what are their
eﬀects on welfare. In state HL bank loans are successful. Banks have excess
funds and use them to transfer ZHL to the insurance companies. Thus, the
only diﬀerence relative to the autarky situation is that at date 2 in states
HL and LH depositors now consume
c2HL =
yR+ zb− e2 − ZHL
1 − λ
, (14)
14c2LH =
yR+ ZLH
1 − λ
.( 1 5 )
The problem is more complicated for the insurance companies. In state
LH the owners of the ﬁrms that insure their machines with the insurance
c o m p a n i e sh a v ep l e n t yo ff u n d s( e q u a lt oA +( 1− φp)R), but the insurance
companies themselves do not have any. They receive αHη in claims and use
all the returns of the short asset to repair the damaged assets. In order for
them to be able to make the payment ZLH at date 2 to the banks they must
hold extra assets. They must charge a higher premium to the ﬁrms initially
and reduce the part of the endowment ﬁrms hold in long assets.
The insurance companies must then decide in which security, short or
l o n g ,t oi n v e s tt h i se x t r aa m o u n tt ob ea b l et op a yZLH. If they invest in the
short asset, they need to make an initial investment s = ZLH to be able to
make the transfer to the banks. The insurance companies can then oﬀer to
the owners of the ﬁrms an expected utility equal to
EVs = βαV(C2HH)+β(1 − α)V (C2HL)+( 1− β)αV (C2LH) (16)
+(1 − β)(1 − α)V (C2LL).
where
C2HH = A + s +( 1− φp − s)R,
C2HL = φp + s + ZHL +( 1− φp − s)R,
C2LH = A + s − ZLH +( 1− φp − s)R,
C2LL = φp + s +( 1− φp − s)R).
The diﬀerent terms relative to the autarkicc a s ec a nb eu n d e r s t o o da sf o l l o w s .
The insurance companies receive an initial premium φp + s from the ﬁrms
and invest it in the short asset; and the ﬁrms invest the remaining (1−φp−s)
in the long asset for a return (1 − φp − s)R in each state. Additionally, in
state HH (which occurs with probability βα), the owners of the ﬁrms enjoy
the return A of the machines and the amount s the insurance companies
distribute to them. Diﬀerently, in state HL(having a probability of β(1−α))
the machines are not repaired and, in addition to the return from their own
investments, the owners of the ﬁrms consume what the insurance companies
distribute, φp+s and the transfer ZHL they receive from the banks. The two
remaining states, LH and LL, are similar with the only diﬀerence that the
insurance companies use s to make the transfer ZLH to the banks in state
LH and do not receive any transfer in state LL.
15Things work slightly diﬀerently if the insurance companies ﬁnance the
transfer ZLH by investing in the long asset. In this case, they charge an
extra premium   such that  R = ZLH and the expected utility of the owners
of the ﬁrms becomes
EV  = βαV(C2HH)+β(1−α)V (C2HL)+(1−β)αV (C2LH)+(1−β)(1−α)V (C2LL)
where
C2HH = A +  R +( 1− φp −  )R,
C2HL = φp + PHL  +( 1− φp −  )R + ZHL,
C2LH = A +  R − ZLH +( 1− φp −  )R,
C2LL = φp + PLL  +( 1− φp −  )R.
The terms have a similar interpretation to the case when the insurance com-
panies ﬁnance the transfer ZLH by investing in the short asset. The only
diﬀerence is that now the insurance companies obtain the return R in states
HH and LH on the extra premium   and liquidate it for a price PHL in
state HL and PLL in state LL. Also the owners of the ﬁr m sm a k ea ni n i t i a l
investment of (1 − φp −  ) in the long asset instead of (1 − φp − s).
There is then a trade-oﬀ in the implementation of the credit risk transfer
for the insurance companies if PHL and PLL are lower than 1 (as we show in
the next section). On the one hand, ﬁnancing ZLH with the long asset avoids
the opportunity cost s(R−1) that the insurance companies suﬀer in each state
when they invest s in the short asset. On the other hand, however, investing
in the long asset induces a loss when the insurance companies go bankrupt in
states HL and LL and have to liquidate the long asset. Depending on which
of these eﬀects dominate, the insurance companies decide how to ﬁnance the
transfer ZLH. Formally, the insurance companies choose to charge an extra
premium   and invest it in the long asset if
∂EV 
∂ 
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
 =0
≥ Max
∙
∂EVs
∂s
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
s=0
,0
¸
. (17)
In order to make this comparison we assume that the banks and insurance
companies make the same transfer in expectation, that is such that
β(1 − α)ZHL =( 1− β)αZLH. (18)
16Using this we can express ZHL =
(1−β)α
β(1−α) R and ZHL =
(1−β)α
β(1−α)s when the
insurance companies ﬁnance ZLH with the long and the short asset, respec-
tively, and show that
∂EV 
∂ 
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
 =0
= R[(1 − β)α[V
0(φp +( 1− φp)R) − V
0(A +( 1− φp)R)]
+[β(1 − α)
PHL
R
+( 1− β)(1 − α)
PLL
R
− (1 − α)]V
0(φp +( 1− φp)R)],
∂EVs
∂s
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
s=0
=( 1 − β)α
£
V
0(φp +( 1− φp)R) − RV
0(A +( 1− φp)R))
¤
−(R − 1)
£
(1 − α)V
0(φp +( 1− φp)R)+βαV
0(A +( 1− φp)R)
¤
.
To gain some insight into the circumstances where credit risk transfer will
be used and when the insurance company will fund its claim with the short
or long asset, we consider three special cases.
Case 1: R =1 ,P HL = PLL =0
In this case the long asset has no return advantage over the short asset. It
has the disadvantage that nothing is received when it is liquidated as would
occur, for example, if there was no market for the long asset. Now
∂EVs
∂s
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
s=0
=( 1− β)α[V
0(1) − V
0(A +1− φp)] > 0,
since A>φ p, and
∂EV 
∂ 
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
 =0
=( 1 − β)α[V
0(1) − V
0(A +1− φp)] − (1 − α)V
0(1)
<
∂EVs
∂s
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
s=0
.
There will be credit risk transfer in this case and the insurance company will
fund its payment with the short asset.
Case 2: R =1 ,P HL = PLL =1
Here the long asset again has no return advantage and in this case it has
no liquidation disadvantage either. We obtain
∂EVs
∂s
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
s=0
=
∂EV 
∂ 
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
 =0
=( 1− β)α[V
0(1) − V
0(A +1− φp)] > 0.
17Not surprisingly creditr i s kt r a n s f e ri sb e n e ﬁcial and the assets are equally
good at funding the insurance companies’ payment.
Case 3: R = V 0(φp +( 1−φp)R)/V 0(A+( 1− φp)R) > 1,P HL = PLL =1
Now the long asset is at an advantage because of its higher return and it
can also be liquidated. Here
∂EVs
∂s
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
s=0
= −(R−1)
£
(1 − α)V
0(φp +( 1− φp)R)+βαV
0(A +( 1− φp)R)
¤
< 0,
so the short asset will not be used. For the long asset
∂EV 
∂ 
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
 =0
= V
0(φp +( 1− φp)R)[(1 − β)α(R − 1) + 1 − (1 − α)R].
For suﬃciently large α and suﬃciently small β this will be positive so it will
be optimal to have credit risk transfer and the insurance companies will fund
their payment with the long asset.
Thus the possibility of sharing risk between the sectors can lead the in-
surance company to hold the long asset even though on its own it has no
need for it. We will assume that these conditions hold in what follows.
5 Liquidity pricing and accounting
In the previous sections we have analyzed the conditions where insurance
companies ﬁnd it optimal to oﬀer partial insurance to the ﬁrms they insure
and where credit risk transfer induces them to invest in the long asset. These
elements constitute two of the important ingredients for contagion from the
insurance sector to the banking sector through the market for the long asset.
In this section we analyze whether the failure of the insurance companies
can propagate to the banks. We show th a th i s t o r i cc o s ta c c o u n t i n ga n d
mark-to-market accounting lead to very diﬀerent outcomes.
The presence of a market for the long asset at date 1 raises the issue that
somebody must supply liquidity to this market. In other words somebody
must hold the short asset in order to have the funds to purchase the long
asset supplied to the market in states HL and LL. If nobody held liquidity,
then there would be nobody to buy and the price of the long asset would fall
to zero at date 1. This can’t be an equilibrium though because by holding
a very small amount of the short asset somebody would be able to enter
18a n dm a k eal a r g ep r o ﬁt. In the framework considered in this paper, the
group that will supply the liquidity is the investors who provide capital to
the banks. In order to be willing to hold this liquidity they must be able
to recoup their opportunity cost. Since in states HH and LH when there
is no liquidation of assets, they end up holding the low-return short asset
throughout, they must make a signiﬁcant proﬁt in at least one of the states
HL and LL when there is a positive supply of the long term asset on the
market. In other words, the price of the long asset must be low in at least
one of these states, and its exact level will depend on the amount of assets
supplied to the market and thus in turn on the accounting method in use.
5.1 Historic cost accounting
We start with the simpler case where asset values are recorded at cost even
if there is a market and asset prices exist. This illustrates the functioning of
markets and the liquidity pricing in our model.
To see precisely how prices are formed, we ﬁrst need to see how many units
of the long asset are oﬀered in the market. Let us start with the banking
sector. Banks invest x units in the short asset, y in the long asset and z in
loans. Given all these assets cost one per unit, under historic cost accounting
they are just worth x + y + z.P r o v i d e d
x + y + z>c 1, (19)
the banks’ assets are above their total liabilities at date 1 and banks remain
solvent and continue operating until date 2. They do not liquidate any assets
at date 1.
Assuming (19) is satisﬁed, the price in the market for the long asset
depends on the sales of the insurance companies. In states HH and LH the
insurance companies do not sell their long assets and the investors will not
use their liquidity to buy any assets. The equilibrium price must then be
PHH = PLH = R. The reason for this is straightforward. If P<R ,the
investors would want to buy the long asset since it would provide a higher
return than the short asset between dates 1 and 2.I nc o n t r a s t ,i fP>R ,the
banks and insurance companies would sell the long asset and then hold the
short asset until date 2. The only price at which both the short and the long
asset will be held between dates 1 and 2, which is necessary for equilibrium
in states HH and LH,i sR.
19In contrast, in states HL and LL the insurance companies go bankrupt
and will liquidate their holdings of the long asset   at a price PHL = PLL =
PL. In order for investors to supply liquidity to the market, the price PL
must be low enough to allow them to cover their opportunity cost of ρ.I n
equilibrium it must be the case that
ρ = α × 1+( 1− α) ×
R
PL
.( 2 0 )
The term on the left hand side is the investors’ opportunity cost of capital.
The ﬁr s tt e r mo nt h er i g h th a n ds i d ei st h ee x p e c t e dp a y o ﬀ to holding the
short asset in states HH and LH, which occur with probability α.T h e
second term is the expected payoﬀ from holding the short asset in states HL
and LL, which occur with probability 1 −α, and using it to buy 1/PL units
of the long asset at date 1. Each unit of the long asset pays oﬀ R at date 2.
Solving (20) gives
PL =
(1 − α)R
ρ − α
< 1, (21)
since ρ>R>1. As α → 1,P L → 0. The less likely is state L where the
insurance companies go bankrupt, the lower the price of the long asset in
that state must be. Notice that this low price is purely driven by liquidity
considerations rather than the fundamentals of the asset.
Taking prices as given, the insurance companies will choose the credit risk
transfer payment ZLH to the banks in state LH and given our assumptions
will fund it with   of the long asset. The banks will choose their payment
ZHL to the insurance companies in state HL. In order for the market to clear
at PL in states HL and LL i n v e s t o r sn e e dt oh o l da na m o u n to fl i q u i d i t yγ
given by
γ = PL . (22)
The simultaneous determination of PL and γ is illustrated in Figure 1.
As explained above, the investors’ participation constraint requires that the
price be given by (21). Rearranging (22) gives
PL =
γ
 
.
This expression can be interpreted in the following way. The insurance com-
panies are bankrupt and are forced to liquidate the long asset   that they
hold. The investors use their cash holdings γ to buy the long asset since
20PL < 1 <R . The price is the ratio of the two quantities so there is cash-in-
the-market pricing. The more liquidity in the market the greater the price
in states HL and LL as illustrated. The point at which this line coincides
with PL gives the market clearing amount of liquidity γ.
To sum up, when historic cost accounting is used credit risk transfer can
improve welfare relative to the autarky situation. This is because credit risk
transfer improves risk sharing between the two sectors and the use of his-
toric cost accounting insulates banks’ from the bankruptcy of the insurance
companies. Even when PL i sq u i t el o ws ot h a tt h eb a n k sw o u l db ei n s o l v e n t
using market prices there is no eﬀect on their activities. This is desirable
since they can fulﬁll all of their commitments.
5.2 Mark-to-market accounting and contagion
The crucial feature of the equilibrium with historic cost accounting is that
the accounting value of the banks’ assets is insensitive to the bankruptcy
of the insurance companies and market prices. We now turn to the situa-
tion where mark-to-market accounting is used and analyze the mechanism
through which the bankruptcy of t h ei n s u r a n c ec o m p a n i e sc a na ﬀect the
accounting value of the banks’ assets and lead to contagion.
The main diﬀerence compared to historic cost accounting is that the ac-
counting value of the banks’ holdings of the long asset now depends on the
market price if a market exists. If no market exists, as we continue to assume
for loans, the historic cost is still used. Thus, when the insurance companies
sell the long asset and there is liquidity pricing, the banks’ long assets are
evaluated at market prices. As a result the value of assets may be below
the value of liabilities at date 1. If this happens in state HL the banks will
be declared bankrupt and will be forced to liquidate their assets at the low
market price. In this case it will no longer be optimal for the banks to make a
credit risk transfer payment to the insurance companies. We therefore focus
on equilibria where there is only bankruptcy in state LL w h e r en oc r e d i tr i s k
transfer payments are made. If PLL is low enough so that
x + yPLL + z<c 1, (23)
the banks are declared insolvent and have to sell their long assets. The supply
of the long asset on the market in state LL is then larger, as both the banks
and the insurance companies need liquidity to satisfy their claims at date 2.
21To see how this aﬀects the pricing of the long asset, consider ﬁrst the
states, HH, HLand LH. As before, in states HH and LH neither the banks
nor the insurance companies sell the long asset. In state HL the insurance
companies sell the long asset while the banks do not. Diﬀerently from before,
however, the equilibrium is such that there is now excess liquidity in state
HL or LL as well. We focus on the case with excess liquidity in state HL.
This surplus of cash means that PHL = R b yt h es a m ea r g u m e n ta sf o rPHH
and PLH above. Thus, the price of the long asset at date 1 in these three
states will be
PHH = PHL = PLH = R.
Given this, the price PLL in state LL must be such that the investors sup-
plying liquidity to the market break even, and must satisfy
ρ =( 1− (1 − β)(1 − α)) × 1+( 1− β)(1 − α) ×
R
PLL
.( 2 4 )
The terms in (24) have a similar interpretation to those in (20). The left
hand side is the investors’ opportunity cost of capital. The ﬁrst term on the
right hand side is the investors’ expected payoﬀ to holding the short asset in
states HH, HL and LH (which have a total probability of occurring equal
to 1 − (1 − β)(1 − α)). The second term is their expected payoﬀ from using
t h ec a s hi ns t a t eLL (which occurs with probability (1 − β)(1 − α)) to buy
1/PLL units of the long asset at date 1 for a per-unit return of R at date 2.
The only diﬀerence relative to (20) is that now investors hold liquidity in all
states except state LL. This means that they have to make higher proﬁts in
this state to induce them to hold cash at date 0. Solving (24), we obtain
PLL =
(1 − α)(1 − β)R
ρ + αβ − α − β
<P L < 1.
Note that because there is a lower probability of the low price in state LL
relative to the case with historic cost accounting, it follows that PLL in (24)
is lower than PL in (21). This implies greater price volatility, in line with
one of the arguments made by practitioners against marking to market. The
greater volatility arises because investors hold more liquidity with historic
cost accounting to absorb the assets of the bankrupt banks. This increases
the price in state HL and lowers it in LL relative to historic cost accounting.
Taking prices as given, the insurance companies will choose the credit
risk transfer payment ZLH to the banks in state LH and will fund it with  
22of the long asset. The banks will choose their payment ZHL to the insurance
companies in state HL. In equilibrium the total supply of long asset to the
market in state LL is   + y. For the the market to clear at PLL, as in (24)
the investors have to hold an amount γ in the short asset between dates 0
and 1 such that
γ = PLL(  + y).
In order for the equilibrium described to hold, it is necessary that γ =
PLL(  + y) >  Rso that there is excess liquidity in state HL and PHL = R
as explained above. If γ<  Rthen PHL <Rand investors make money in
state HL as well as in state LL. This case can be analyzed similarly.
To sum up, diﬀerently from the case with historic cost accounting, the
use of mark-to-market can generate contagion from the insurance sector to
the banking sector and leads to a reduction in welfare. The investors and
the insurance companies have the same levels of utility as in autarky. The
banks are worse oﬀ since they go bankrupt and their assets are liquidated at
al o wl e v e li ns t a t eLL. However, taking prices as given the actions chosen
by the insurance companies and banks are optimal. If an insurance company
w e r en o tt oe n g a g ei nc r e d i tr i s kt r a n s f e ri tw o u l ds t i l lr e c e i v et h es a m ea s
in autarky. If it was to use the short asset to fund its credit risk transfer
it would be strictly worse oﬀ. If a bank was to choose not to do credit
risk transfer, it would still be liquidated in state LL and it would not have
the beneﬁt of the credit risk transfer. The expected utility of its depositors
would fall.
The reason for the poor performance of mark-to-market accounting is that
when prices are determined by liquidity rather than future payoﬀst h e ya r en o
longer appropriate for valuing ﬁnancial institutions’ assets. The equilibrium
prices are low to provide incentives for liquidity provision. They are not low
b e c a u s ef u n d a m e n t a l sa r eb a d .T h i sp o i n th a si m p o r t a n ti m p l i c a t i o n sf o rt h e
debate on mark-to-market accounting versus historic accounting for ﬁnancial
institutions. It suggests that mark-to-market accounting can signiﬁcantly
increase the possibility of contagion. Historic cost accounting is superior in
this respect.
5.3 Discussion
The only role of the market for the long asset at date 1 in the model is to allow
the long asset to be liquidated when the insurance companies go bankrupt.
23Buyers are induced to participate through low prices in some states. This is
the sense in which the market is illiquid and is subject to liquidity pricing. If
t h e r ew e r eo t h e rp a r t i c i p a n t si nt h em a r k e ts ot h a ti tw a sm o r el i q u i dt h e nt h e
assets would be priced in a diﬀerent way. For example, consider the following
circumstances. In some states one group of banks has a large proportion
of early consumers while the remaining group has a low proportion. In the
other states the reverse is true. Overall there is no aggregate uncertainty
about the proportion of early and late consumers. There is just uncertainty
about which banks will have a large proportion of early consumers. As in
Allen and Gale (2004b) and Allen and Carletti (2006) the banks can use the
market for the long asset at date 1 to reallocate liquidity. In this case the
market will be liquid. When the insurance companies go bankrupt prices
will only change slightly to absorb the extra supply and this change will be
insuﬃcient to attract liquidity from the investors. Provided the market is
suﬃciently liquid to absorb the liquidations without large price changes the
contagion eﬀect identiﬁed in the model above will not be present.
A second important assumption of the model is that contracts are in-
complete. If contracts are complete so that insurance companies’ and banks’
payouts can be made contingent on the state, bankruptcy can be avoided. In
states HL and LL, a complete contract would allow insurance companies to
provide no insurance so bankruptcy would not occur. Insurance companies
would then not be forced to liquidate the long asset and there would be no
contagion.
Finally, we have assumed the return on the long asset R is constant.
Despite this, the price ﬂuctuates because of liquidity pricing. If there was
uncertainty in fundamentals so R was random, the problem identiﬁed would
be exacerbated. The price would vary with R and this would increase volatil-
ity over and above the level with just liquidity pricing.
6A n e x a m p l e
In this section we present a numerical example to show that the conditions
for contagion given above can be simultaneously satisﬁed. We assume the
following values. The long asset returns R =1 .1,l o a n sy i e l dB =3with
probability β =0 .7,a n dﬁrms’ total demand for loans is z =0 .3.D e p o s i t o r s
have utility function U(c)=Ln(c) and become early consumers with prob-
ability λ =0 .5. Investors have an opportunity cost equal to ρ =1 .15.T h e
24payment to banks’ on their loans is b = ρ/β =1 .64 and their investment in
loans in equilibrium is z = z =0 .3.
Banks in autarky
Using the values of the example, we get the following solution for the
bank in autarky (maximize (1) subject to (2)-(6) but ignoring (7)):
e0 =0 .25;e1 =0 ;e2 =0 .42;
x =0 .5;y =0 .45;z =0 .3;
c1 =1 .00;c2H =1 .15;c2L =1 .00;
EU =0 .0487.
Comparing c1 and c2L it can be seen that the constraint (7) is satisﬁed in
this example.
The risk sharing between the depositors and the providers of capital is
incomplete. The late depositors’ consumption is 1.15 when the banks’ loans
pay oﬀ but only 1.00 when they do not. As explained in Section 3, the reason
is that capital is costly. In other words the opportunity cost of capital of the
providers’ of capital is higher than the return on the long asset. If it was
the same, there would be full risk sharing and depositors would consume the
same amount in every state.
Insurance companies in autarky
To provide an example where partial insurance is optimal so that there
is systemic risk in the insurance sector, we assume A =1 .15, η =1 , α =0 .9,
αH =0 .5 in state H and αL =1in state L. Finally, the utility function
of the owners of the ﬁrm is V (c)=Ln(c) and recall that the endowment of
each ﬁrm is 1. With partial insurance we have C2H =1 .7 and C2L =1 .05 so
that the expected utility of ﬁrms is EVp =0 .482. With full insurance it is
instead C2H =1 .65 and C2L =1 .15 so that
EVf =0 .465 <E V p =0 .482.
Thus despite providing higher consumption in state L full insurance is not
optimal because the opportunity cost of providing it is too high. The optimal
scheme is for the insurance industry to partially insure ﬁrms, charge a pre-
mium equal to αHη =0 .5 at date 0 and leave ﬁrms to invest the remaining
part 1 − αHη =0 .5 of their endowment in the long asset.
Credit risk transfer
25We next consider credit risk transfer. Table 2 summarizes the payoﬀst o
t h eb a n k s ’l a t ed e p o s i t o r sa n dt h ei n s u r e dﬁrms’ owners in autarky.
Table 2
State Probability Bank Insurance Late Firms’
loans claims depositors owners
HH 0.7 × 0.9=0 .63 B =3 αHφ =0 .51 .15 1.7
HL 0.7 × 0.1=0 .07 B =3 αLφ =1 1 .15 1.05
LH 0.3 × 0.9=0 .27 0 αHφ =0 .51 .00 1.7
LL 0.3 × 0.1=0 .03 0 αLφ =1 1 .00 1.05
There is a market for the long asset at date 1. We initially consider what
happens when there is historic cost accounting and the insurance company
uses the long asset to fund its credit risk transfer. We then consider mark-
to-market accounting and show that there is contagion.
Historic cost accounting
The assets of the banks are x =0 .5;y =0 .45;z =0 .3. If the banks’ assets
are evaluated at their historic cost, they are worth x + y + z =1 .25. This is
above the total liabilities at date 1 of c1 =1 .00 so the bank remains solvent
irrespective of what happens to the market value of its assets.
As explained above in Section 5.1 PHH = PLH = R =1 .1. From (21)
PL =
(1 − α)R
ρ − α
=0 .44.
Given this value for PL, we solve the problem under the assumption that
banks retain the surplus from the credit risk transfer and the owners of the
ﬁrms enjoy the same level of expected utility as in autarky. It can be shown
that the optimal transfers are
ZHL =0 .058 in state HL and
ZLH =0 .018 in state LH.
Note that in doing this optimization, we keep the portfolios of the banks
t h es a m ea sb e f o r eh e r ea n db e l o w ,f o re a s eo fe x p o s i t i o n .S t r i c t l ys p e a k i n g
with the transfers ZHL and ZLH the banks will reoptimize and have slightly
diﬀerent portfolios. Taking account of this change does not alter the results
below.
26The insurance companies ﬁnd it optimal to fund their transfer with the
long asset. They choose   =0 .016 to provide the necessary funds. Using
(22), the amount of liquidity that the investors hold is
γ = PL  =0 .007.
The level of utility of the banks’ depositors with historic cost accounting
is
EU
HC =0 .0496,
which is higher than the level of 0.0487 that they obtain in autarky.
The crucial feature of this equilibrium is that the accounting value of the
banks’ assets is insensitive to the bankruptcy of the insurance companies and
market prices. The banks do not have to sell the long asset and can continue
until date 2.
Mark-to-market accounting
As explained in Section 5.2, with mark-to-market accounting the form of
the equilibrium is slightly diﬀerent. Here
PHH = PHL = PLH = R =1 .1.
In the remaining state LL it follows from (24) that
PLL =
(1 − α)(1 − β)R
ρ + αβ − α − β
=0 .183.
Given this price, it can be shown that the optimal transfers that keep the
insurance companies at their reservation level of utility and maximize the
bank depositors’ welfare are
ZHL =0 .056 in state HL and
ZLH =0 .020 in state LH.
The insurance companies ﬁnd it optimal to fund their transfer with the long
asset. They choose   =0 .018 to provide the necessary funds. In equilibrium
the total supply of long asset to the market in state LL is   + y =0 .018 +
0.45 = 0.468. In order for the market to clear at PLL =0 .183 the investors
have to hold an amount γ in the short asset between dates 0 and 1 to clear
t h em a r k e ta td a t e1 such that
γ = PLL(  + y)=0 .086.
27Since   =0 .018 we have R  =0 .020 <γ=0 .086 so there is excess liquidity
in state HL as required for PHL = R above.
The low price PLL provides the incentive that is needed for the investors
to provide the liquidity for the market. However, it also means that the
banks are forced to liquidate at date 1 in state LL. The reason is that the
value of their assets is
x + y × PL + z =0 .5+0 .45 × 0.183 + 0.3=0 .882,
and this is less than their liabilities of c1 =1 .00. They therefore go bankrupt
and their long assets are liquidated in the market for 0.45 × 0.183 = 0.082.
It can then be shown that the level of utility of the banks’ depositors with
mark-to-market accounting is
EU
MTM =0 .0235.
This is clearly less than the depositors’ expected utility with historic cost
accounting EUHC =0 .0496.
The example illustrates how the interaction between mark-to-market ac-
counting and liquidity pricing can be damaging in times of crisis. There is
contagion of the systemic risk that arises in the insurance sector to the bank-
ing sector. The price is low in state LL to give incentives for investors to
provide liquidity to the market. It does not reﬂect the payoﬀ on the asset
itself. This is a constant R =1 .1 in all states. The banks can meet all of their
commitments going forward. Nevertheless under mark-to-market accounting
they are insolvent. Their premature liquidation leads to a signiﬁcant loss of
w e l f a r ei nt h i se x a m p l e .
7C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
We have shown that if there is mark-to-market accounting there can be con-
tagion which causes banks to be liquidated unnecessarily. Historic cost ac-
counting does not suﬀer from this drawback.
The model presented in this paper was developed in the context of bank-
ing and insurance. It is clear that this context is not crucial for similar
eﬀects to arise. It is the interaction of incentives to provide liquidity with
a c c o u n t i n gr u l e st h a ti sk e y .T h i sc a no c c u ri nm a n yc o n t e x t s .
We have focused on one advantage of historic cost accounting compared
to mark-to-market accounting. The debate is a complex one and this is
28just one factor among many. If mark-to-market is adopted based on other
arguments, a way of mitigating the potential for contagion is not to strictly
apply this accounting methodology in times of crisis. Rather than simply
d e c l a r i n gi n s t i t u t i o n sb a n k r u p ti tm a yb eb e t t e rt ow a i tu n t i lt h ee p i s o d eo f
liquidity pricing is over.
This paper has considered the private provision of liquidity in markets
and has not analyzed the role of central banks in liquidity provision. In
markets with widespread participation the central bank can provide liquidity
to participants and liquidity pricing will be mitigated. However, in markets
with limited participation, it is likely that central banks may have problems
injecting liquidity that will reach the required markets and prevent the fall
in prices and contagion considered in the paper. The justiﬁcation used by
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for their intervention in arranging a
private sector bailout of Long Term Capital Management in 1998 explicitly
used this rationale. The LTCM case was somewhat more complex than the
model analyzed here as in addition to liquidity issues the future payoﬀso f
assets were also uncertain. However, as we argued above, this uncertainty
about fundamentals exacerbates the problem. Investigating the precise role
of central banks in this kind of situation would be an interesting question for
future research. Similarly, it would also be interesting to analyze the eﬀects
of introducing markets for other assets like loans.
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